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ACADEMICS DON’T NECESSARILY KNOW WHAT description is,
but they know they don’t like it. ‘‘That talk was wonderfully descriptive; let’s
give him the job’’—said no one ever. When scholars from multiple disci-
plines gather to evaluate grant proposals, they can usually agree on one
thing: the wisdom of rejecting any project they consider ‘‘merely descrip-
tive.’’ And at least one university department’s grading rubric formalizes its
low judgment of work that ‘‘is correct but largely descriptive, lacking anal-
ysis’’ by assigning such papers a C.1 Boring and static, rote rather than
creative, reproductive rather than productive: description in such moments
does not even rise to the status of a necessary evil. Instead, it is defined by
failure or falling short: lacking a compelling argument or organizing per-
spective; insufficiently self-conscious of its own procedures; basic in the bad
sense of naive and mechanical. Even the clearest accounts of description
often contrast it to what it is not—not interpretation, not explanation, not
prediction, not prescription.
Yet description is everywhere, a ubiquitous and necessary condition of
scholarship, and in practice, if not in preaching, attitudes toward it vary
across and within disciplines.2 Although scientists aim at explaining causal
mechanisms and identifying predictive laws, many consider description an
activity sufficiently worthy in its own right that one can find highly cited
articles whose titles identify them as ‘‘descriptions’’—of forest geckos, road
surface roughness, molecular excitations, or valence bonds.3 Social scien-
tists express more overt ambivalence about description. In 1980, economist
Amartya Sen wrote, ‘‘It is fair to say that description as an intellectual activity
is typically not regarded as very challenging. To characterize a work in the
social sciences as ‘purely descriptive’ would not normally be regarded as
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high praise.’’4 Three decades later, John Gerring similarly noted that in
political science description ‘‘has come to be employed as a euphemism for
a failed, or not yet proven, causal inference. Studies that do not engage
causal or predictive questions, or do not do so successfully, are judged
‘merely’ descriptive.’’5 But Sen and Gerring also contest this view by under-
scoring the fundamental importance of descriptions in social science and by
foregrounding the skills needed to produce them. Nor are they alone. Many
historians and ethnographers would say that without description, albeit of
a highly interpretive kind, they could not produce historical narratives or
field notes.6 Humanists often keep their engagement with description tacit
and articulate their explicit discomfort with ‘‘mere description’’ by insisting
(rightly) that description cannot be separated from interpretation. Even so,
art historians, literary critics, and musicologists must learn to describe the
paintings, sculptures, texts, and musical works that they study.7
We believe that description is a core, if unacknowledged, method in all
scholarship and teaching. In order to proceed, interpretations, explana-
tions, and prescriptions must give an account of—describe—what they
interpret, explain, or evaluate. Description makes objects and phenomena
available for analysis and synthesis, and is rarely as simple as its critics imply.
An elusive object that travels by many names, and sometimes by no name at
all, description’s dictionary definitions include representation, drawing,
report, portrayal, and account. Description can take many forms, including
lists, case studies, sequences, taxonomies, typologies, genealogies, and prev-
alence studies, and it involves many actions, including observing, measur-
ing, comparing, particularizing, generalizing, and classifying, using words,
images, and numbers.8
We write from the perspective of literary critics who became interested
several years ago in questioning the dominance of interpretive methods in
our discipline. In 2009, Stephen Best and SharonMarcus published a special
issue of Representations called ‘‘The Way We Read Now.’’ The introduction to
that volume gathered a set of recent developments in literary studies under
the rubric ‘‘surface reading,’’ referring to methods trained on ‘‘what is evi-
dent, perceptible, apprehensible in texts.’’9 In 2010, Heather Love published
an essay called ‘‘Close but Not Deep’’ that proposed the observational social
sciences as a model for descriptive readings of literary texts.10 It was in part
the controversy generated by these essays that prompted us to take a closer
look at description: to assess what were widely cited as its limitations, or even
dangers, and to further explore what we still imagined to be its unacknowl-
edged and even untapped potential.11 What, we wondered, would it mean to
acknowledge the ways that our critical and pedagogical practices make
description central—to prosody, plot summary, histories of the book, even
to allegorical and symptomatic interpretations? What would we learn if we
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widened our purview to ask scholars and practitioners from disciplines
beyond literary studies to reflect on their own practices of description?
We were also inspired by the example of a handful of scholars across
several disciplines who have turned their attention to description.12 Work in
media archaeology, data mining, discourse analysis, and object-oriented
ontology has assigned new value to the work of gathering and analyzing
information. Legal theorist Anne Orford has recently championed descrip-
tion, citing Michel Foucault’s claim that the role of philosophy is not ‘‘to
reveal what is hidden, but rather to make us see what is seen.’’13 Anthropol-
ogist Anna Tsing, in her work on ecology and nonhuman sociality, advocates
what she calls ‘‘critical description’’—‘‘critical, because it asks urgent ques-
tions; and description, because it extends and disciplines curiosity about
life.’’14 By far the most vocal, provocative, and influential proponent of
description as method in recent years has been sociologist of science Bruno
Latour, who asks, in Reassembling the Social (2005), ‘‘What is so wrong with
‘mere’ descriptions?’’15 Calling description ‘‘the highest and rarest achieve-
ment’’ (137), Latour encourages scholars to take ‘‘the risk of writing a true
and complete report about the topic at hand’’ (127).
For scholars to ‘‘risk’’ description sounds counterintuitive, even cheeky,
since description is so often seen as plodding, but Latour is riffing on the
disgrace that description suffered in the wake of the linguistic turn that began
in the 1960s, when interpretation and self-consciousness about language as
representation challenged the reign of observation, fact, and objectivity.16
In 1973, the animal ethologist Konrad Lorenz lamented the ‘‘fashionable
fallacy of dispensing with description,’’ relaying an anecdote about a grant-
ing board cautioning researchers not to ‘‘lapse into being merely descrip-
tive.’’ The cost of such ‘‘widespread contempt for description,’’ Lorenz
argued, was ‘‘that it discourages people from even trying to analyze really
complicated systems.’’17 Recently, scholars interested in complex systems—
from global climate change to the literary world system—have begun to
experiment with what it might mean to describe, explain, and analyze rather
than to theorize or critique. And across several disciplines, those interested
in materialism and nonhuman forms of agency have taken heed of polit-
ical theorist Jane Bennett’s call, in Vibrant Matter, to ‘‘bear witness to the
vital materialities that flow through and around us’’ by means of ‘‘a cultivated,
patient, sensory attentiveness.’’18
These developments have encouraged us to try to offer a fuller account
of description, to consider it on its own terms and not as a stepping-stone on
the way to interpretation and critique. We do not come to description out of
a desire to launch a new theory or discover the next new thing, but rather
from a sense that an enduring practice may be a sign of an enduring project.
The strange status of description—valued in practice, but often publicly
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disavowed or dismissed—has made it hard to account for its full range of
meanings, effects, techniques, and potentials. Attending to description’s
ubiquity within critical practice may be one way of gaining access to what
is generative within (and generated by) the disciplines as such. We see the
practice of description as well suited to emergent evidence that exceeds but
might ultimately be essential to reformulating the frame of analysis, and as
thus providing (at times) occasion for a writing that registers where objects
push back against existing frames (see the Kathleen Stewart and Liza
Johnson essays in the current volume). As such, the practice of description
provides the material that gives future scholars (including the future self of
the describer) the opportunity to engage differently with their objects, and
serves as a building block for extending the collective and networked aspects
of scholarly work across time. We see and want to encourage the essential
generosity that can attach to description as a practice when it attends not
only to its objects but also to the collective, uncertain, and ongoing activity
of trying to get a handle on the world.19
All the same, in order to describe description, we need to account more
fully for its bad reputation, which stems from the serious, if contradictory,
charges that influential scholars in the humanities and social sciences have
leveled against it for decades: that description is impossible, because all
knowledge is situated; that it is ideological, because objectivity always masks
interests; and that it is insufficiently critical or even tautological, because it
simply repeats what anyone can see or hear.
The argument that description is impossible because it is only, always,
and already interpretation is closely linked to the argument that it is ideo-
logical; both arguments have important antecedents in literary criticism,
anthropology, marxist thought, science studies, feminist theory, and critical
race studies. Authors such as Nancy Hartsock, Donna Haraway, Mary Louise
Pratt, and Bruno Latour in his early work were among the first to expose
the particularities and limits of objectivity, detachment, and distance.20
They argued that the neutrality that many associate with description denies
the embodiment, social position, and investments of the observer. No
describers can isolate what they observe from their beliefs, opinions, and
experience, but some are able to claim objectivity, performing the ‘‘god
trick’’ that Donna Haraway criticizes in ‘‘Situated Knowledges.’’21 Claiming
a ‘‘view from nowhere,’’ the view of no particular observer or no observer at
all, description masks its investments and obscures the real conditions of its
existence and the existence of what it describes in ways that enable domi-
nation in both the academy and in the public sphere.22 As Jill Morawski
observes in her essay for this volume, researchers and institutions seen as
disinterested acquire power, credibility, and influence, while perspectives
4 Representations
and methods that do not claim objectivity are associated with bias, particu-
larity, and special pleading.
Views of description as impossible and ideological tend to cast it as a slick
con artist, passing itself off as objective in order to score illegitimate gains.
But description is also seen as a dull accountant, mindlessly but persistently
generating exhaustive inventories. In his influential 1936 essay ‘‘Narrate or
Describe?’’ Georg Luka´cs presents descriptions in fiction and poetry as
homogenizing and static, incapable of conveying the world’s vivacity, diver-
sity, and flux. For Luka´cs, description merely interrupts narration, which
advances plot, illuminates characters’ interior lives, and establishes relations
of cause and effect. In this still dominant view, description qua description is
aimless, pointless, even deadening. Aimless: without a thesis, a describer has
no way to focus attention and guide observation. Pointless: on its own,
description has no meaning; what matters are the larger forces, mechan-
isms, and values it serves to illustrate. Deadening: descriptions are just one
damn thing after another. Even if we could overcome our biases and pay
equal attention to everything, the result would be an overwhelming welter of
details, the intellectual equivalent of boxes full of styrofoam peanuts. As
Naomi Schor writes, ‘‘There is always the danger that to write on the detail
is to become lost in it.’’23 Description is either too small, focused on minute
details (the tiny pits and striations marking each styrofoam peanut), or too
large, an exhaustive catalog of inconsequentiality (all those boxes overflow-
ing with styrofoam peanuts). Instead of falling down descriptive rabbit
holes, this critique goes, intellectuals must go beyond mere description to
uncover meanings; identify underlying causes or laws; distinguish what mat-
ters from what doesn’t; and develop frames and filters that provide order,
perspective, history, and context.24
Damned as inaccurate and biased when it does not adequately represent
the world, description is equally damned as tautological when it reflects the
world too closely. Jorge Luis Borges points to the absurdity of literal descrip-
tion in his famous account of a map as big as the world, ‘‘On Exactitude in
Science,’’ in which a ‘‘Cartographers’ Guild’’ makes ‘‘a Map of the Empire
whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with
it.’’25 Borges’s postmodern parable combines the critique of description as
tautological with the critique of description as inevitably inaccurate. By
simply repeating the terrain feature by feature, the one-to-one scale map
neither adds knowledge to the world nor gives us a usable image of it. At the
same time, the map fails because it is not identical to the world, since, like
any representation, it transforms what it describes by translating it into
a different medium that lags behind its object. Drawn in order to satisfy the
desire for total accuracy, the map is abandoned to ruin by the later genera-
tions who find it ‘‘useless’’ (325).
Building a Better Description 5
Taken together, these criticisms allow us to extrapolate a profile of what
we might call ‘‘bad description’’ and ‘‘bad describers.’’ Bad describers
observe, count, measure, copy, list, and catalog objects with either stultifying
exhaustiveness or selective incompleteness that is often ideologically moti-
vated. Bad describers aspire to detachment from their human limitations, or
lack the insight, imagination, or intelligence needed to explain, predict,
evaluate, or interpret. They sever what they describe from larger contexts
or histories, seeking to pin things down and contain them rather than to
capture their flux. They produce bad descriptions because they are pedants;
because they seek institutional power and rewards through claims to objec-
tivity; or because they naively believe that words, images, or numbers can
adequately represent worlds.
The common view of description as ideological, impossible, and uncrit-
ical means that few standards exist that would distinguish good descriptions
from bad ones; indeed, the common view suggests that all descriptions are
bad, or at best a devalued preliminary to truly productive or original work.
The proliferation of binary oppositions in which description appears as the
less valued term situate it as the kind of grunt work that people overlook or
belittle but without which they could not function. Humanists, for example,
are often reluctant to acknowledge anthologies, descriptive catalogs, biblio-
graphies, and finding aids as scholarship, yet their more interpretive work
often could not proceed without these compendia, lists, accounts, and
classifications.26
One response to catching ourselves out in the contradiction of practic-
ing description while preaching against it might be to expunge it more
thoroughly, so that our actual methods would align better with our beliefs,
but that would be difficult to achieve. Another might be to accept descrip-
tion as a necessary but lesser activity, which would engage us in the dubious
ethics of affirming a division of scholarly labor in which the least skilled,
least imaginative, or least intelligent do the work of describing.
A third response, the one we propose, would be to stop taking the lesser
status of description for granted, and to turn a critical eye on the ways we
conventionally assign and withhold value and prestige. At the conference
that led to this special issue, held in April 2015 at Columbia University and
sponsored by its Heyman Center for the Humanities, we asked people from
a range of disciplines to weigh in on description. How have practices of
description—from ethnography to ekphrasis—shifted in light of changing
views of the role of the observer, scholarly ethics, and epistemology? What
protocols are involved in describing people, texts, images, musical scores,
natural phenomena, and material artifacts? We invited scholars and practi-
tioners from the arts, the humanities, the social sciences, and the sciences.
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Not everyone accepted the invitation to participate, and not all participants
were able to contribute to the volume, but the essays here offer a cross-section
of the event, with representation from a historian of science, a psychologist,
an art historian, two literary critics, an anthropologist, a filmmaker, and
a memoirist.
The essays gathered in this special issue attempt to describe description,
as well as to interpret, explain, and evaluate it. Our contributors are not
united in their attitudes: several essays are critical of description, calling
attention to its ongoing role in the consolidation of traditional forms of
authority, and even questioning the utility of an analytic separation of
description from interpretation. But the sustained attention to description
in a range of contexts yields a portrait of an already existing practice that is
more complex than its critics have taken it to be and offers some visions of
how a better description might operate.
All of the contributors, to different ends, undo the binary oppositions
that have relegated description to a secondary role, questioning any simple
distinction between describer and described, description and narration,
description and interpretation, science and literature, part and whole, orig-
inal and copy. Some reaffirm elements of the classic critiques of description
(Jill Morawski, Michael Fried, Georgina Kleege), while in very different ways
engaging in description themselves. Psychologist Jill Morawski’s ‘‘Descrip-
tion in the Psychological Sciences’’ revisits a notorious experiment in scien-
tific psychology, the Stanley Milgram study of obedience. By delving into
Milgram’s archives and ‘‘redescribing’’ them, Morawski contrasts the tradi-
tional image of objective description to the complexity of actual practice,
demonstrating the reductions that take place when scientists aspire to trans-
late research results for widespread public circulation. Morawski suggests
that ‘‘thickening’’ psychological descriptions would represent human behav-
ior in ways too complex to spawn truisms and directives. In ‘‘No Problem,’’
art historian Michael Fried challenges the idea that works of visual art pose
special challenges to description because of the intrinsic differences
between linguistic and pictorial artifacts. He also questions whether obser-
vation and description can take place in an interpretive void; to the extent
that any description of a painting has persuasive force, it must and does
serve an argument. Memoirist and disability studies scholar Georgina
Kleege, in ‘‘Audio Description Described,’’ surveys the current standards
and practices for audio description, a mechanism for making visual media
accessible to blind people. For Kleege, descriptions that attain perfect objec-
tivity by completely eliminating evaluation and interpretation are neither
possible nor desirable. Using as her example the film The Sessions (2012),
which itself foregrounds its characters’ many acts of description, Kleege
refuses objectivity and interpretive neutrality as goals. Instead, she finds a less
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pure but richer and more useful audio description in crowdsourced forms of
the practice that provide multiple and avowedly subjective accounts of single
works.
Other contributors offer accounts of what we might call ‘‘better descrip-
tion,’’ which address some of the classic objections to description. In ‘‘Inter-
pret or Describe?’’ literary critic Cannon Schmitt revisits Georg Luka´cs’s
influential essay ‘‘Narrate or Describe?’’ and demonstrates the continued
bias among literary critics against description. Schmitt argues that interpre-
tation and description are mutually interdependent, and that critical fears
about the ‘‘view from nowhere’’ must be balanced against the dangers of the
‘‘view of nothing.’’ Through readings of drawings in Alison Bechdel’s
graphic memoir Are You My Mother? (2012) and technical language in Cor-
mac McCarthy’s novel The Road (2006), Schmitt shows how the referential
and practical elements of representations can be useful, meaningful, even
beautiful and moving.
Other contributors share Schmitt’s view of description as more affective
than detached. In ‘‘The Point of Precision,’’ anthropologist Kathleen
Stewart performs descriptive writing conceived as simultaneous with an
unfolding reality rather than belatedly reproducing a fixed one. Stewart’s
ethnography homes in on moments of disorientation and heightened sense
perception that erupt when a category or concept lags behind its ability to
takeholdof aphenomenon.ForStewart, suchpoints of precision, or threshold
phenomena, trigger a descriptive machinery that calls on us tomake a report
not only of what we encounter but also of ourselves encountering it.27 In
‘‘Observable Behavior 1–10,’’ filmmaker Liza Johnson addresses visible
behavior as the raw material of film performance. Actors convey character
and ‘‘pulses of affect’’ through microscopic changes in facial expression and
bodily comportment, and film directors and editors elicit, observe, and inter-
pret these components of visible behavior. In contrast to the idea of descrip-
tion as a flattening, static practice that relies on a strict separation between
the describing subject and the objects described, Stewart and Johnson see
descriptions as responsive to the liveliness of material relationships and
realities and as taking on forms that embody or mimic what they describe.
Other contributors offer historical accounts that expand our sense of
description by pointing to the varied ways it has been practiced and valued.
In ‘‘Cloud Physiognomy,’’ historian of science Lorraine Daston offers a view
of description as anything but encyclopedic and tautological. She shows how
nineteenth-century scientists interested in developing a Linnaean system of
cloud classification had to abandon the natural historian’s comprehensive
attention to detail in order to find a way to fix objects that were in constant
motion and looked different to different viewers in different locations. In
the place of description as endless enumeration, Linnaeans practiced
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description by subtraction or omission: only by ignoring ‘‘siren details’’
could observers identify patterns and types and learn to recognize clouds
as they would faces. In ‘‘Description and the Nonhuman View of Nature,’’
literary critic Joanna Stalnaker considers eighteenth-century French
descriptive poetry alongside natural history in order to challenge the asso-
ciations of science with objectivity and literature with the imagination. Like
Daston and Kleege, Stalnaker sees description as a collective, networked
social practice rather than an isolated and isolating one. For all three,
describers move between the scientific and the poetic, the professional and
the colloquial, and description is neither the view from nowhere, nor simply
the view from somewhere, but many views from many places, over time.
For several of our contributors, the describer is as much a part of the
description as the object described. This means that description appears
more like the active complexity of a networked field of actors than like
a temporally and spatially frozen practice of distanced observers who incor-
porate description into their models as a ‘‘low’’ practice that precedes and
must be transcended by analysis and interpretation. We see our contribu-
tors’ invitation to rethink and revalue description as responding to critical
habits and assumptions acquired during the years when poststructuralism
dominated thinking in the humanities and encouraged scholars to distance
themselves from the claim that critics themselves could produce positive
knowledge. What is noteworthy about these essays is that they go about their
descriptive work without being in any particular rush to make a broader
claim. At times, this feels not like a return to objectivity but like the latest
development in the general critique of objectivity that rippled through the
humanities and social sciences in the final decades of the twentieth century.
If, as Haraway argues in ‘‘Situated Knowledges,’’ ‘‘only partial perspective
promises objective vision’’ (583), these essays move toward such a vision
through attention to the liveliness of objects, to description’s collective and
networked aspect, and to the robust connection between describing subject
and object described. In something of a prodigal return, our contributors’
call for a ‘‘better description’’ does not try to reverse the linguistic turn’s
critique of positivism but to incorporate it.
Extrapolating from these essays, what might a better description look
like?
1. Not so much description itself as our opinion of it might be improved
by adjusting our attitude toward literalism and tautology. Does knowledge have to
be different from its object to be knowledge? In the paper she presented at
the ‘‘Description Across the Disciplines’’ conference, Bechdel affirmed
Schmitt’s intuition about her work by noting, ‘‘I have always been a literal-
ist.’’ Bechdel’s attempts to get the details right in her graphic fiction depend
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on extensive archival research, copying from photographs, and reenact-
ment.28 Critics of tautology would say that knowledge should differ from its
object; critics of literalism, realism, and mimesis, that knowledge can’t help
but do so. For advocates of description, however, literalism can serve a use-
ful purpose with respect to knowledge. Not all of our contributors would
agree. Stewart advocates deliteralizing descriptions, and Kleege prefers
nonliteral audio descriptions. Johnson, however, accepts the tautological
literalism of acting as both innocuous and generative: actors observe
behavior, not always knowingly, then reproduce it as behavior. There is
no intention or causation beneath or behind the behaviors on display in
her strips of film. Practical knowledge might present another worthy form
of descriptive tautology, as when Schmitt reflects cautiously on exhaustive
technical descriptions as sanctioning a kind of ‘‘long-form tautology.’’ In
praise of literalism, he cites Bechdel’s account of a friend who figured out
how to light a charcoal grill using a chimney starter from reading her
comic strip Dykes to Watch Out For—a practical knowledge that Bechdel
arguably did not understand herself to be depositing in her text, but that
was nonetheless there from the start, as the offshoot of her observational
precision as an artist.29
2. Far from taking such literalism for granted, however, a better descrip-
tion would also reconceive the relation between world and word by shifting from
the assumption that describers readily apply words to worlds to an awareness
of just how difficult it can be to do so. It is frequently asserted that descrip-
tion strives to achieve a ‘‘deadened realism of finished forms and social
facts’’ (‘‘Point of Precision’’). Poets and meteorologists might claim the
opposite: that description exists only because language, images, and num-
bers can never fully capture the world. The Art of Description, a short book that
poet Mark Doty calls a ‘‘work of advocacy’’ on description’s behalf, notes that
‘‘our knowledge of the sensory world is nothing fixed, but a continuing
reappraisal, a set of processes that figure and refigure the world.’’30 In his
view, description embraces rather than denies the problems of reference
and incommensurability that have long preoccupied scholars and thinkers,
but with an important difference. Incommensurability can motivate descrip-
tion not as something to be overcome but as a way to build the uncertainty of
any attempt to describe into descriptions themselves. In an extended read-
ing of how description works in Elizabeth Bishop’s poem ‘‘The Fish,’’ Doty
notes that description affords shifts in perspective that result in ‘‘an intox-
icating uncertainty’’ (30, emphasis added). Stalnaker reminds us that for
Enlightenment writers like Denis Diderot, descriptions were never perfectly
adequate to their objects, but that Diderot did not believe that their inevitable
incompleteness therefore made descriptions useless (The Unfinished Enlight-
enment, 107). Rather, he and other Enlightenment thinkers took description
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as an occasion ‘‘to wrestle with the incommensurability between language and
nature, or to experiment with new approaches to writing in order to commu-
nicate the messy empirical data of firsthand observation’’ (9).31
Grappling in a slightly different way with the incommensurability prob-
lem, Stewart notes that ‘‘reality itself is incommensurate with any attempt to
grasp it’’ but suggests that this is precisely why and how description ‘‘must
become weirdly, robustly realist.’’ In The Art of Description, Doty similarly
asserts that ‘‘poetic description wants to do anything but reinscribe the
already known’’ (63); it does not presume a preexisting reality that it seeks
to capture with perfect accuracy; rather, poetic description’s task is ‘‘to make
the world real’’ (137). As we have seen, we ordinarily think of bad descrip-
tion as an exhaustive catalog that asserts a deadening power over what it
describes, and of description as redeemed only when it serves a preexisting
interpretive framework. Stewart disagrees, arguing that description at its
best does not emerge from or confirm an unavowed interpretive schema;
instead, better describers attend to what eludes easy categorization and
understanding. A better description would faithfully capture—this is its
robust realism—the world’s messy profusion of stray details that cannot
be assimilated to an already existing theory and that sometimes might not
even precipitate a new one.
3. It would then follow that a better description would embrace stray
details. Bad description is often associated with an overvaluation of the
detail, either attending to too many details at once, or to details that serve
no apparent purpose because they cannot be integrated into any extant
frame or schema.32 Not all our contributors would disagree. For Kleege,
‘‘less is more,’’ and Daston notes how Linnaean cloud classifiers had to curb
‘‘the temptation to remark, register, and . . .name an enticing detail that
eluded the standard descriptive template,’’ unlike natural historians, who
reveled in ‘‘the infinitely graduated continuum of clouds.’’ By contrast,
Stewart’s describer is positively ‘‘overwhelmed by an excess of surfaces,
aspects, and remainders’’; her world is enlivened by this proliferation of
details. Johnson begins by noting that we are often impressed by observers
who are able to see minute shifts in facial expression as ‘‘legible pulses of
affect’’: notice these details, and ‘‘you seem psychic.’’ These small units of
observable behavior are anything but insignificant; they are seemingly thin
details whose thickness is all on their surface, observable on actor’s faces, in
their gestures, and in the repeated frames that constitute a GIF (graphics
interchange format) image. Stalnaker similarly notes how such excessive
details were essential to Enlightenment describers. In Jacques Delille’s sci-
entific poem Les Trois Re`gnes (1808), for example, vivid details become the
hinge for a massive shift in scale that decenters human perspectives. Viewing
a mite under a microscope, each of its minute details enlarged, allows the
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poetic speaker to imagine even smaller beings for whom the mite could
appear as an entire cosmos: ‘‘This insect is himself an Atlas.’’
In Vibrant Matter, Jane Bennett argues that receptiveness to stray details
is necessary in order to see the world outside of received categories: ‘‘One
needs, at least for a while, to suspend suspicion and to adopt a more open-
ended comportment. If we think we already know what is out there, we will
almost surely miss much of it’’ (xv). Other thinkers have argued that descrip-
tions that make room for stray details can upend rather than reinforce
ideology and received ideas. Attending to details, far from inducing stasis,
can make available imaginative shifts in perspective and scale that might
produce a ‘‘dramatic decentering of the human perspective’’ (‘‘Description
and the Nonhuman View of Nature’’). Critic Michel Beaujour notes that
surrealist Andre´ Breton preferred scientific to literary texts because ‘‘the
unpredictable strangeness of the truth could then intrude explosively into
the universe of stereotyped verisimilitude.’’33 Iris Marion Young makes a sim-
ilar point in an essay on phenomenology and the pregnant body in which she
uses the description of a pregnant body (her own) to take to task phenom-
enologists who focus on concrete experience but ignore sexed being:
‘‘Description of the pregnant body . . . challenges the generalizations often
made by phenomenologists of the body’’ and ‘‘is subversive to the social
structure.’’34
4. A better description might respond to the objectivity problem by
attending to the describers as much as to the described. If we understand descrip-
tion as enhanced attention, we can direct that attention inward and out-
ward, to how we describe as well as to what we describe. Attentiveness to the
consciousness of the viewer can unseat or displace description’s claims to
objectivity by undoing the presumption of a strict separation between the
object described and the subject describing. As Stewart puts it, ‘‘The object
of the description is also its agent.’’ Indeed, for several of our contributors,
description is a multiparty affair that depends on relations between describers
(Kleege, Daston); takes relations rather than discrete objects as the thing to
be described (Stalnaker); or emerges from pulses of affect exchanged
between actors and directors who stand in for the audience (Johnson).
5. To avoid the pitfalls of objectivity, better describers might foreground
and attend to the protean nature of what we describe. Often the very instability of
things is what calls out for a descriptive vocabulary. Where Daston’s cloud
taxonomists respond to the volatile multifariousness of clouds by establish-
ing strict protocols that seek to stabilize ideal cloud types, Stewart suggests
that attempts to describe the ‘‘shaken profusion of things’’ can be a bid to
‘‘capture existence in the very act of its constitution.’’ Social interactions that
morph even as they take form, events without clear beginnings or endings:
Johnson pursues a related track in her focus on elements of film grammar
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that seem more descriptive than narrative, more lingering than action-
oriented. Long takes and wide shots make room for the unexpected and
the metamorphic by taking more time than strictly necessary to tell a story
and by taking in a lot rather than tightly framing what we see. In her book-
length study of description, Stalnaker similarly shows how Louis Mercier, in
his account of Paris in the decade following the French Revolution, strove to
capture a describer in constant motion and a city in constant flux by devis-
ing a labile descriptive practice that itself took place in time.35
Morawski similarly calls on scholars to craft descriptions that take seri-
ously the protean qualities of what we describe as well as the uncertainty of
any descriptive procedure. Schmitt notes that the arguments inhering in
descriptions change every time we add a new item to them; as he puts it, the
parataxis of listing one thing after another becomes the hypotaxis of logical
relationships that shift with each new element added to the list. Kleege’s
account of audio description underscores the delicate timing required to
layer commentary over a film’s soundtrack, whether the commentator is
trying to concisely signal changes in camera angles or to insert descriptions
of action between pauses in the dialogue. To describe under such condi-
tions—under time pressure, in response to a multifarious and fleeting rep-
resentation—is to invite opportunities for language to fail and for felicitous
surprises. In this sense, the will to describe can engage and even overcome the
limitations of description by becoming a form of responsive wandering dur-
ing which ‘‘subjects and objects are at once taken aback and literally trans-
formed by their own self-surprised acts and effects’’ (‘‘Point of Precision’’).
6. Finally, we might rethink objectivity itself. One way to build a better
description is to accept the basic critique of objectivity as impossible and
undesirable. In response, we might practice forms of description that
embrace subjectivity, uncertainty, incompleteness, and partiality. But why
not also try out different ways of thinking about objectivity? Responsible
scholarship is often understood as respecting the distinction between a phe-
nomenon and the critical methods used to understand it; the task of the
critic is to transform the phenomenon under consideration into a distinct
category of analysis, and to make it an occasion for transformative thought.
Mimetic description, by contrast, values fidelity to the object; in the case of
descriptions that aim for accuracy, objectivity would not be about crushing
the object, or putting it in perspective, or playing god, but about honoring
what you describe. Stewart evokes how people who see something a little bit
off are moved tomake a report ‘‘out of a strange . . . faithfulness to the spirit of
the unnamed thing they witnessed’’; Doty frames description as ‘‘allegiance to
the sensible, things as they are, the given, the incompletely knowable’’ (137,
emphasis added). In this sense, objectivity would not mean generating a uni-
versal account but wouldmean trying to get something right by attending to it
Building a Better Description 13
closely and accurately describing how you see it—you in particular, you as
a member of a class or group, you as a person with a particular kind of
knowledge, training, or values.
Honoring what one describes can involve reenactment, translation,
memorizing, and copying—practices and forms that tend to be more highly
valued in times and places that do not emphasize individuality, originality,
and novelty. Engaging in tautological description instead of anxiously doing
all we can to avoid it would also allow us to pose the almost taboo question of
whether knowledge must always produce something new. If we free our-
selves from the demand that everything be related to a grand theory or yield
surplus knowledge, we might come to see even tautological description in
a better light. Description might become a noninstrumental accumulation
of particulars with no immediately clear purpose. Or, like the shifts in scale
that ‘‘decenter the human perspective’’ (‘‘Description and the Nonhuman
View of Nature’’), description conceived of as honoring the object described
might occasion a kind of ecstatic dispossession or pleasure in identifying
with an object, being, or world. Such acts of mimetic description are unlikely
to generate institutionally familiar genres of scholarship, but they can be
creative, illuminating practices that produce forms, data, and insights keyed
to the liveliness of worlds and works.
Why describe? Because describing and descriptions can produce plea-
sure—granular, slow, compressed, attentive, appreciative—as when Roland
Barthes reproduces, codes, and interprets every sentence of a Balzac novella
in S/Z, then reproduces the text again in its entirety. Because description
can make us more attentive, as when we produce an audio description, copy
a painting, analyze or perform a piece of music, and annotate or memorize
a text. Because description can allow us both to see more and to look more
attentively, more fully, andmore selectively. Because description can take us
out of ourselves, as when we try to see a mite or to see like a mite. Because
description connects us to others—to those described, to the makers of what
we describe, to other describers.
Bad description, better description: we conclude with two smiles. In her
criticism of the objectivity imperative in audio description, Kleege explains
that professional audio describers are instructed to avoid all personal inter-
pretation and commentary. The premise is that if users are provided with an
unbiased, unadorned description, they will be able to interpret and judge
a film for themselves. Kleege writes, ‘‘In extreme instances, this imperative
about absolute objectivity means that a character will be described as turning
up the corners of her mouth rather than smiling.’’ For Kleege, reducing the
familiar act of smiling to turning up the corners of one’smouth is both absurd
and condescending. The effort to produce an objective, literal account only
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leads to misunderstandings, awkwardness, and bathos. This zero-degree
description is the paradoxical result of taking the critique of description, with
its mistrust of interpretation and subjectivity, to one logical extreme. Tell-
ingly, the professional audio describer’s ‘‘voice from nowhere’’ is not only
weirdly particular; it also fails to be genuinely descriptive, since its ‘‘calm,
controlled, but also cheerful’’ tone remains the same nomatter what is being
described. In place of the pretense of objectivity, Kleege suggests that the best
audio descriptions do not sedulously avoid all interpretation, but instead
combine observation with interpretation, understood variously as emotional
reactions; inferences about cause and effect; or conventional, shared, and
tacit knowledge.
A second smile: discussing her practice as a film director, Johnson
recounts a scene in her film Hateship Loveship (2013) in which actor Kristin
Wiig performs a ‘‘microsmile’’—in Johnson’s words, ‘‘the smallest smile I have
ever seen.’’ This gesture is an example, in Richard Schechner’s words, of
‘‘restored’’ or twice-performed behavior.36 Although the smile is Wiig’s and
expresses ‘‘her work, her choices,’’ it comes from outside, because it is derived
from her observations of untraceable others and ‘‘from what is around her in
that moment’’—including Johnson herself, smiling outside the frame. For the
actor, as for the film director and editor, concrete physical behavior is not
a quantum of data to be interpreted; it is her material, and she describes this
behavior not to explain or interpret it, but to make it visible. Johnson thus
helps us see that mere description need not be a bad thing.
Given that scholarship, aesthetic practices, and behaviors all involve
description, we might consider suspending our conventional skepticism
about it.
The worst that might happen? To see a world in a styrofoam peanut.
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